Ahmadinejad's ferocity underlines the potency of the new policy of seeking to influence rather than oust the ayatollahs
The letter to Iran being drafted in Washington represents a determined break from past US policy but officials said yesterday there was still considerable debate on how and when to engage Tehran in talks.
Details have yet to be decided. At what level should talks take place? Should they grow organically from the existing six-nation negotiating group or open up a new track? When should negotiations start and, in particular, should they be postponed until Iran's presidential elections in June, for fear of helping Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election campaign, which was formally launched yesterday?
There is one thing everyone agrees on – it is impossible to do any kind of business with the current Iranian president. Ahmadinejad's speech in Kermanshah yesterday, demanding complete US withdrawal from all overseas deployments, clearly illustrated that.
"Those who say they want to make change, this is the change they should make: they should apologise to the Iranian nation and try to make up for their dark background and the crimes they have committed against the Iranian nation," Ahmadinejad said. He specifically mentioned the toppling of the government in 1953, the support for the shah and for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war, and the downing of an Iranian airliner in 1988.
He fulminated against what he said were efforts to block Tehran's supposedly peaceful nuclear power programme and hinder Iran's development since the 1979 revolution, the event which along with the US embassy hostage crisis served to define bilateral relations for a generation.
And he had harsh words for George Bush, who he said "has gone into the trash can of history with a very black and shameful file full of treachery and killings. He left and, God willing, he will go to hell."
It was never clear whether the Bush administration was seeking to bring about regime change in Tehran or simply trying to persuade Iran's theocratic rulers to change policy on uranium enrichment.
The ambiguity was inevitable. The administration itself never quite made up its mind, and different strategies rose to the top of the White House agenda at different times, depending on who was winning the battle for the president's ear.
While mixed messages emanated from the Bush administration, only one was clearly received in Tehran – that Iran was next on the Axis of Evil list after Iraq.
The lesson of the Iraq invasion for the Iranian leadership was that Saddam lost his job and then his life not because he might have had weapons of mass destruction but because he had none. North Korea, the third member the axis, which had nuclear bombs, was treated with much greater respect. The hard task ahead for the Obama team is how to correct those perverse incentives.
Obama is intent on pursuing a very different approach. US policy is focused now on influencing the ayatollahs' behaviour and perceptions, not driving them out. The new president this week repeated his inaugural line, "we will extend our hand if you will unclench your fist", and explicitly addressed it to Tehran. The ferocity of Ahmadinejad's response does make one thing clear: the Tehran hardliners are more terrified of a moderate and charismatic new voice from Washington than all the sabres rattled by the Bush administration.
Obama does not trigger the same Persian-nationalist response that used to rally Iranians around Ahmadinejad's government at the prospect of American bombs. Perhaps more importantly, given the nature of Iranian elections, the arrival of a soft-talking administration may change the mind of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, about the sort of president he wants to see elected.
The more radical thinkers now installed at their desks in Washington argue there is no need to wait until the June presidential elections. The Iranian presidency does not decide nuclear policy, even if it influences the political mood and sets limits on what is negotiable.
That wing argues there are ways of sending messages and making contacts that will not benefit Ahmadinejad. The opening of an American-staffed US interests section in Tehran, considered then rejected by the Bush administration, is on the table as a first step in a possible progression towards a normal relationship.
The administration radicals believe it is time to invert what they see as another fundamental flaw in Bush policy – tying US interests to reactionary Sunni regimes in the Arab world as a bulwark against Shia militancy. Tehran is militant, the new thinkers argue, but it is at least a rational state actor, with defined goals and interests, and therefore ultimately more amenable to cool discussion and engagement.
The more cautious wing warns against hasty interference in an opaque political system with all the unintended consequences that might entail.
The letter to Iran being drafted in Washington represents a determined break from past US policy but officials said yesterday there was still considerable debate on how and when to engage Tehran in talks.
Details have yet to be decided. At what level should talks take place? Should they grow organically from the existing six-nation negotiating group or open up a new track? When should negotiations start and, in particular, should they be postponed until Iran's presidential elections in June, for fear of helping Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election campaign, which was formally launched yesterday?
There is one thing everyone agrees on – it is impossible to do any kind of business with the current Iranian president. Ahmadinejad's speech in Kermanshah yesterday, demanding complete US withdrawal from all overseas deployments, clearly illustrated that.
"Those who say they want to make change, this is the change they should make: they should apologise to the Iranian nation and try to make up for their dark background and the crimes they have committed against the Iranian nation," Ahmadinejad said. He specifically mentioned the toppling of the government in 1953, the support for the shah and for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war, and the downing of an Iranian airliner in 1988.
He fulminated against what he said were efforts to block Tehran's supposedly peaceful nuclear power programme and hinder Iran's development since the 1979 revolution, the event which along with the US embassy hostage crisis served to define bilateral relations for a generation.
And he had harsh words for George Bush, who he said "has gone into the trash can of history with a very black and shameful file full of treachery and killings. He left and, God willing, he will go to hell."
It was never clear whether the Bush administration was seeking to bring about regime change in Tehran or simply trying to persuade Iran's theocratic rulers to change policy on uranium enrichment.
The ambiguity was inevitable. The administration itself never quite made up its mind, and different strategies rose to the top of the White House agenda at different times, depending on who was winning the battle for the president's ear.
While mixed messages emanated from the Bush administration, only one was clearly received in Tehran – that Iran was next on the Axis of Evil list after Iraq.
The lesson of the Iraq invasion for the Iranian leadership was that Saddam lost his job and then his life not because he might have had weapons of mass destruction but because he had none. North Korea, the third member the axis, which had nuclear bombs, was treated with much greater respect. The hard task ahead for the Obama team is how to correct those perverse incentives.
Obama is intent on pursuing a very different approach. US policy is focused now on influencing the ayatollahs' behaviour and perceptions, not driving them out. The new president this week repeated his inaugural line, "we will extend our hand if you will unclench your fist", and explicitly addressed it to Tehran. The ferocity of Ahmadinejad's response does make one thing clear: the Tehran hardliners are more terrified of a moderate and charismatic new voice from Washington than all the sabres rattled by the Bush administration.
Obama does not trigger the same Persian-nationalist response that used to rally Iranians around Ahmadinejad's government at the prospect of American bombs. Perhaps more importantly, given the nature of Iranian elections, the arrival of a soft-talking administration may change the mind of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, about the sort of president he wants to see elected.
The more radical thinkers now installed at their desks in Washington argue there is no need to wait until the June presidential elections. The Iranian presidency does not decide nuclear policy, even if it influences the political mood and sets limits on what is negotiable.
That wing argues there are ways of sending messages and making contacts that will not benefit Ahmadinejad. The opening of an American-staffed US interests section in Tehran, considered then rejected by the Bush administration, is on the table as a first step in a possible progression towards a normal relationship.
The administration radicals believe it is time to invert what they see as another fundamental flaw in Bush policy – tying US interests to reactionary Sunni regimes in the Arab world as a bulwark against Shia militancy. Tehran is militant, the new thinkers argue, but it is at least a rational state actor, with defined goals and interests, and therefore ultimately more amenable to cool discussion and engagement.
The more cautious wing warns against hasty interference in an opaque political system with all the unintended consequences that might entail.
Julian Borger, diplomatic editor
Guardian
